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COMMENTARY
THE EMERGING LAW OF FEDERAL
ASSISTANCE
RICHARD B. CAPPALLI*
Professor Catz's wonderfully detailed demonstration of grantee due
process rights could not be more timely. The budget holocaust of 19811
undoubtedly will produce funding cutoffs as federal administrators
struggle to meet their severe spending limits, as did their predecessors
during the Nixon economic retrenchment.2 While the Impoundment
Control Act3 has created a process for congressional-executive collabo-
ration on wholesale funding reductions, called "rescissions" and "de-
ferrals," the Act does not address the question of actions on individual
grants and does contain its own ambiguities.' Cutoffs will result not
only from efforts to comply with statutory mandates, but also from self-
initiated budget actions of agency heads eager to please the chief by
trimming program fat.
We are pleased that Catz's legal exploration confirms many of the
thoughts we set forth in Rights and Remedies Under Federal Grants.5
The core of the idea is simple enough: the Supreme Court offers proce-
dural due process to statutory entitlements, and the grant-in-aid quali-
fies as such an entitlement.' The challenge is the idea's elaboration in a
© Copyright 1982 by Richard B. Cappalli.
* Professor of Law, Temple University. B.A., 1962, Williams College; J.D., 1965 Columbia
University; LL.M., 1972, Yale University.
1. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357.
2. See generally Mills & Munselle, Unimpoundment: Politics and the Courts in the Release of
Impounded Funds, 24 EMORY L.J. 313 (1975); Note, Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment
and Congressional Power, 82 YALE LJ. 1636 (1973).
3. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1407
(1976). Title X of this Act is known as the "Impoundment Control Act." See id § 1301 note.
4. A major ambiguity is whether the President may postpone expenditures when the pro-
gram legislation mandates spending but sets no time limits. Compare 54 Comp. Gen. 453 (1974)
with Maine v. Goldschmidt, 494 F. Supp. 93 (D. Me. 1980).
5. R. CAPPALLI, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER FEDERAL GRANTS 180-243, 331-58 (1979).
6. Compare, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (due process attaches
to "legitimate claim of entitlement") with Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330
U.S. 127, 136-37 (1947) (highway allocations are entitlements).
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field as richly complex as federal assistance. Our earlier writing and
the Catz effort should together offer a firm analytical foundation for
courts and agencies interested in creating satisfactory hearing proce-
dures for grantees facing adverse fiscal action.
This commentary offers some additional thoughts and information
about the main article. While these are reportorial and disconnected,
they suggest important dimensions of the problem. Following these
addenda, we attempt to place the due process issue in the broader
framework we refer to as the emerging law of federal assistance.7 The
right to due process is but one element of a broader trend toward the
formalization and legalization of the assistance system. Seeing the
Catz theories in this broader mosaic confirms their viability and
significance.
I.
The setting of the main article is the dramatic, sympathy-provoking
ternination of the financing of a struggling community organization.
The article's scenario excludes the funding termination or audit disal-
lowance of a state or local government administering "entitlement"
grants. As to volume, this latter situation is by far the most important.
In the years following the Great Society program explosion, the
formula grant to state and local governments maintained its position as
the dominant form of federal aid,' and, outside the research and
development field, the discretionary project grant slipped in impor-
tance.9 In terms of quantitative value, therefore, the most relevant
7. Also known as the "slumbering giant." See Southern Mut. Help Ass'n v. Califano, 574
F.2d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The metaphor has attracted a large and growing number of ad-
mirers. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, AWAKENING
THE SLUMBERING GIANT: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND FEDERAL GRANT LAW (1980);
R. CAPPALLI, supra note 5, at I; Catz, Due Process and Federal Grant Termination: Challenging
Agency Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1067, 1070 (1982).
8. Compare 1 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FISCAL BAL-
ANCE IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 151-53, 294 table A-22 (1967) (280 project grant pro-
grams distributing $2.8 billion; 99 formula programs distributing $9.8 billion, 78% of total) with
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CATEGORICAL GRANTS: THEIR
ROLE AND DESIGN 44 table 1-17, 92 table IV-1 (1978) (296 project grant programs distributing
$11.6 billion; 157 formula programs distributing $37.6 billion, 76% of the total).
9. The heyday of the project grant was the latter part of the 1960s in programs such as
model cities, urban renewal, community action, and vocational training. Many of these were
absorbed into formula entitlements such as the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317 (1976), and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-992 (1976).
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question is whether process is owed state and local governments when
federal administrators attempt to strip them of entitlements in whole or
part. While this question is preliminarily posed in the same way as for
a nonprofit organization-is the grant a property which cannot be de-
prived without due process?-the additional issue arises as to whether a
government agency is a "person" to whom fifth amendment protections
extend. In its 1966 decision South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme
Court thought not. '0 Fortunately, the Court's analysis in that case was
perfunctory and superficial, making, we think, the decision surmount-
able." Apart from precedent, one confronts the argument that states
and cities have little need for due process because they can use their
political influences to protect themselves in Washington.12 We demon-
strate the analytical falsity of this reasoning in our earlier writing,' 3 and
congressional action in 1981 was a strong practical demonstration of its
falsity in practice.' 4
Two further distinctions between the state (or other entitlement re-
cipient) suffering a formula grant cutoff and the nonprofit organization
suffering a project grant cutoff deserve mention. First, in the typical
case the former gets a statutory right to pretermination notice and hear-
ing, 15 while the latter gets nothing. 6 This makes the constitutional due
process protection less significant but not insignificant, because many
statutes do not protect formula grantees with the boiler plate hearing
clause. 7 Also, the constitutional right acts as a backup in cases in
which there is a statutory due process right. When the federal adminis-
trator has begrudgingly implemented the statutory right with proce-
dures perceived by an entitlement recipient to be inadequate, the
Constitution is available to test the reasonableness of the agency proce-
10. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966).
11. See R. CAPPALLI, supra note 5, at 225-43.
12. See, ag., F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON GOVERNMENT IN URBAN
AREAS 1049 (1970); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalisrn The Role ofthe States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
13. R. CAPPALLI, supra note 5, at 234-36. 4ccord, Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sover-
eignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 857-68 (1979).
14. The states got their block grants, see note 20 infra and accompanying text, but only in
hybrid form. Multiple federal "strings" continued to be attached resulting in a severe financial
cost and sharp reductions in total appropriations. See Stanfield, The Dry End of the Deal, 13
NAT'L J. 1554 (1981).
15. See R. CAPPALLI, supra note 5, at 245-46 n.2; note 22 infra.
16. See R. CAPPALLI, supra note 5, at 272-79.
17. See id at 247 n.3. See also note 21 infra.
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dure.' 8 The second distinction is that nonprofit organizations do not
have the taxing power. The state agency can preserve its program
through new assessments, but the nonprofit organization has no alter-
native but to disband. The economic realities of state and local
finances, however, make the distinction purely theoretical in many
cases.
In 1981, Congress shifted 7.5 billion dollars out of the categorical
grant system (both formula and project)' 9 and into several new "block"
grants.2 ° What effects will this have on grantee rights to notice and an
opportunity to be heard? With only one exception,2' a statutory right
to prior notice and opportunity to be heard at the primary level is given
to the states when the federal secretary is contemplating withholding
part or all of a block grant.22 This simply follows the statutory pattern
18. See, e.g., NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 330 (D. Del. 1978)
(due process claim rejected), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979).
19. Stanfield, For the States, t's Time to Put Up or Shut Up on Federal Block Grants, 13
NA'rL J. 1800 (1981).
20. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 551-558, 95 Stat. 463-
69 (to be codified in 20 U.S.C. §9 2844, 3801 & note, 3802-3807) (Education Consolidation and
Improvement Act of 1981); Id §§ 561-587, 95 Stat. 469-80 (to be codified in 20 U.S.C. §§ 3811-
3863) (consolidation of various education grant programs); id §§ 2601-2611, 95 Stat. 893-902 (to
be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 8601-8612, 8621 & note, 8622-8629) (Low-Income Home Energy
Assistance Act of 1981); id §§ 671-683,95 Stat. 511-19 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 9901 & note,
9902-9912) (Community Services Block Grant Act); Social Security Act of 1935, tit. V, as added
by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2191-2192, 95 Stat. 818-26
(to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 701-716) (Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant Act);
Public Health Service Act, tit. XIX, pt. A, as added by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 901, 95 Stat. 535-43 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 300w to 300w-8)
(Preventive Health and Health Services Block Grant); Public Health Service Act, tit. XIX, pt. B, as
added by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 901, 95 Stat. 543-52
(to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 300x to 300x-9) (Alcohol and Drug Abuse and Mental Health
Services Block Grant); Public Health Service Act, tit. XIX, pt. C, as added by Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 901, 95 Stat. 552-59 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300y to 300y-1 1) (Primary Care Block Grants). A ninth block grant was not new but reworked.
Social Security Act of 1935, tit. XX as revised by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2351-2352, 95 Stat. 867-71 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397-1397f) (So-
cial Services Block Grant Act).
21. Most likely because of inadvertence, the hearing right afforded states in the original so-
cial services block grant was dropped in the 1981 revision. Compare Social Security Act of 1935,
§ 2003(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1397b(e) (1976) with Social Security Act of 1935, tit. XX, as revised by
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2351-2352, 95 Stat. 867-71 (to
be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397-1397f).
22. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 592,95 Stat. 480-81 (to
be codified in 20 U.S.C. § 3872); id § 2608, 95 Stat. 901-02 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 8627); id
§ 679, 95 Stat. 51 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 9908); Social Security Act of 1935, § 506(b), as
added by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2192, 95 Stat. 824 (to
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/4
COMMENTARY
23of the replaced and remaining formula entitlement programs.
On the secondary level, at which funds flow through the state to
political subdivisions and the private nonprofit sector, the block grant
seems to strip subgrantees of federal procedural protection. The fifth
amendment no longer applies because the United States' involvement
after sending the state its block grant payments is minimal. If a fund
cutoff occurs at the subgrant level, the deprivation is not the handiwork
of the federal government. Federal statutory protection will be un-
available to subrecipients because the streamlined block grants are free
from such mandates.2 4 Federal administrative protection will be ab-
sent because, in catching the block grant spirit, agencies will not use
their discretion to add management and procedural mandates.25 Con-
sequently, if the disputes circular of the Office of Management and
Budget is ever finalized,26 it will probably not extend to the block
grants.
Nevertheless, the fourteenth amendment prevents deprivation by
states without due process. What may happen is that states, prodded
by the federal bureaucracy, will set up distribution systems parallel to
those in the federal assistance system for parceling out their own block
grants, and in this process create entitlements. The entire due process
scenario, including Catz-like articles of lesser dimension, will become a
road show in each of the states. While the blocks may have decon-
gested the federal assistance system somewhat, the price will be conges-
tion and confusion at the state level.
be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 706n); Public Health Service Act, § 1907, as added by Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 901, 95 Stat. 541-42 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 300w-6); Public Health Service Act, § 1917, as added by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 901, 95 Stat. 550-51 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 300x-6); Public
Health Service Act, § 1929, as added by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-35, § 2192, 95 Stat. 558 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 300y-8). This hearing right is imple-
mented, as to the block grants administered by the Department of Health and Human Services, at
46 Fed. Reg. 48,582, 48,590-91 (1981) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. §§ 96.51-.68).
23. See R. CAPPALLI, supra note 5, at 245-46 n.2, 289-90 n.1.
24. Cf Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, § 106(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 816(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979) (grievance procedures required to be established by CETA prime
sponsors); Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, § 164(c), 20 U.S.C. § 2811(c) (Supp.
III 1979) (state education agency hearings for school district applicants for subgrants).
25. See 46 Fed. Reg. 48,582, 48,584 (1981) (Department of Health and Human Services;
exemption of block grants from normal administrative rules); 46 Fed. Reg. 43,690 (1981) (Com-
munity Services Administration; grantees left with "responsibility of complying with statutory
requirements without further detailed direction from the Federal Government").
26. See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
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At the federal level, two events are in process which bear importantly
upon the subject of the main article. One is the creation of an adminis-
trative directive that will promote uniformity in agency dispute mecha-
nisms. In September of 1980, the Office of Management and Budget
announced the initiation of a policy review that would explore the de-
sirability of a government-wide assistance policy on handling disputes
between federal agencies and assistance recipients.27 This review had
produced a draft set of guidelines and standards28 and had started
lively debate29 when it apparently lost momentum because of the
change of administration in Washington. This policy review did result
in a modern regulation for the Grant Appeals Board of the Department
of Health and Human Services, which should be the model for dispute
resolution processes in the years to come.3 °
The second event is congressional contemplation of across-the-board
treatment of grantor-grantee disputes, although the proposed measures
at the time we write are disappointingly modest. The latest version of
the Federal Assistance Improvement Act contains a section entitled
"Procedural Safeguards."'" Our pulse quickened when we first noticed
the clause, which was added by the Senate Committee on Govermnen-
tal Affairs. Here, we thought, was the grantee bill of procedural rights
and the government-wide disputes board we passionately advocated in
Rights And Remedies.32  Not quite. What parades under the
procedural safeguards banner is merely an advance statement of rea-
sons to state and local governments when federal administrators con-
template withdrawing aid, refusing to renew aid, and reneging on an
announced entitlement. States and localities can also get an explana-
tion of why their applications for discretionary funds have been re-
jected. The Senate Committee desires to prevent the grants system
from being converted into a regulatory system, to preserve its present
flexibility and informality, and to avoid unnecessary tension, "delays,"
and "confusion."33 This view is a far cry from the regimen of legal
27. 45 Fed. Reg. 63,592 (1980).
28. Draft dated Aug. 11, 1980 (on file with author).
29. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL ASSIST-
ANCE ROUNDTABLES: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS at V to V-20 (mimeographed July 20,
1981).
30. 46 Fed. Reg. 43,816 (1981) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. §§ 16.1-.23).
31. S. 807, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 601 (1981).
32. See R. CAPPALLI, supra note 5, at 331-59.
33. S. REP. No. 97-136, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1981).
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entitlements that Professor Catz and I perceive. The grant system is
still being controlled by the public administrators, who are nervously
looking over their shoulders as the lawyers close in.
The public administrators misperceive both the nature of the assist-
ance system and the intent of the lawyers, or at least that of some of us.
To describe grants as nonregulatory ignores the thousand or so man-
dates attached to federal aid for cities, counties, and other users.3 4
These cannot be ignored, for it is such mandates, and not procedural
safeguards, that produce tension, delay, confusion, and inflexibility. As
we stated in Rights And Remedies,
[a]ccording procedural fairness. . . does not alter the fundamental rela-
tionships between the national government and its partners in govern-
ance. On the contrary, it promises to avoid dislocation of whatever
working balance has been politically struck at any point in time. Insisting
that the states be given a voice in the partnership simply affirms their
dignity, essentiality, and ability to contribute.35
Perhaps the public administrators fear the importation of the rituals of
medieval legal systems. It need not happen that way, however. The
Health and Human Services Department has an appellate process that
is flexible, efficient, streamlined, responsive, and easily understandable
to the layman. 6
II.
The Catz article is important in its own right. Recognition of a right
to a hearing prior to grant termination will appreciably raise the fair-
ness quotient of the federal assistance system, whether it occurs in one
or more statutes, an OMB directive, a program regulation, or an adju-
dication. Yet the article attains even more significance when viewed as
part of a broader development, which we can call the emerging law of
federal assistance.37
34. C. LOVELL, R. KNEISEL, M. NEIMAN, A. ROSE & C. TOBIN, FEDERAL AND STATE MAN-
DATING ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: AN EXPLORATION OF ISSUES AND IMPACTS 56 (1979). See
also 5 JOINT ECON. COMM., SPECIAL STUDY ON ECONOMIC CHANGE, 96th CONG., 2D SEss. 326-
77 (Comm. Print 1980) (Work by Muller & Fix entitled The Impact of Selected FederalActions on
Municipal Outlays).
35. R. CAPPALLI, supra note 5, at 242-43 (footnote omitted).
36. See note 29 supra.
37. For some of my earlier thoughts on the lawyer's place within the grant system, see Cap-
palli, Federal Grant Disputes: The Lawyer's Next Domain, 11 URa. LAW. 377 (1979). The infelici-
tous title may explain some of the nervousness of the public administrators. See text
accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
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The field of federal assistance has moved out of the era graphically
described in the Cahns' seminal 1968 article as "the antithesis of de-
mocracy" and as a lawless "no man's land."3 We believe that one may
fairly characterize today's federal assistance both as a "system" and as
a "body of law." These elements combine to produce the systematic
application of a body of common rules, thereby enabling us to speak of
the emerging "federal assistance law." Here, we will sketch the main
characteristics that federal assistance law shares in common with older
branches of American law. The details will have to await our forth-
coming treatise on the topic.39
First, a set of fundamental purposes informs federal assistance law,
and these purposes have, in turn, spawned central concepts and
precepts. One example is the basic purpose of support:4" federal aid
transfers economic resources, produced by the powerful sixteenth
amendment taxing power, to subnational institutions that have consti-
tutional responsibility for basic governmental functions but suffer from
impoverished treasuries. From the support rationale derive the basic
precepts of grantee autonomy4 and voluntary grantee participation in
federal assistance.42 The optional nature of grantee participation in
federal economic support has resulted in a doctrine of construction
38. Calm & Cahn, The New Sovereign Immunit, 81 HARV. L. REv. 929, 971 (1968).
39. The treatise is tentatively to appear in three volumes under the title FEDERAL AssIsT-
ANCE and is scheduled to be published in the fall of 1982.
40. See Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977, § 5, 41 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp.
III 1979).
Each executive agency shall use a type of grant agreement as the legal instrument reflect-
ing a relationship between the Federal Government and a State or local government or
other recipient whenever-
(1) the principal purpose of the relationship is the transfer of money, property, serv-
ices, or anything of value to the State or local government or other recipient in order to
accomplish a public purpose of support ....
Id See also R. CAPPALLI, supra note 5, at 34-42.
41. See Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977, § 5, 41 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp.
III 1979):
Each executive agency shall use a type of grant agreement as the legal instrument reflect-
ing a relationship between the Federal Government and a State or local government or
other recipient whenever-
(2) no substantial involvement is anticipated between the executive agency, acting
for the Federal Government, and the State or local government or other recipient
during performance of the contemplated activity.
Id See also Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1980) (grants of federal funds do not create
partnership between government and recipient); United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 815-18
(1976) (grant regulations do not transfer grantee's actions into those of federal government).
42. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1536-37, 1539-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/4
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under which the terms of support, unilaterally established by the
United States, will be strictly interpreted against the United States
when grantee responsibilities are sought to be implied from vague stat-
utory language.43
Second, the law of federal assistance is unified and made coherent by
a set of operational rules common to all programs. This enables
knowledge, interpretations, and solutions to be transferred between
programs, and it makes viable the teaching and practice of federal
assistance administration and law. One body of common principles is
the product of statutes that apply to all federal financial assistance,
thereby sweeping under their mandates the hundreds of separate aid
programs." A second body comes from repetitive patterns in the stat-
utes that authorize aid: common statutory style, structure, mechanics,
and boiler plate. Cost-sharing ("matching"), maintenance of effort,
nonsupplantation, federal audit, and access to grantee records are but a
few examples. A third body of common principles is the inspiration of
the Office of Management and Budget in the form of circulars. These
are directives to the federal agencies on topics such as grant administra-
tion,45 intergovernmental cooperation,4 6 and cost principles.47 Finally,
there is even a comprehensive statute that contains a potpourri of rules
tagged onto assistance programs.48
40 (1981); Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 425 (1974). See generally R. CAPPALLI, supra note 5,
at 80-88.
43. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1540 (1981) which
stated that "[b]y insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise
their choice [of accepting or rejecting federal assistance] knowingly, cognizant of the consequences
of their participation."
44. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) (prohibition of racial
and ethnic discrimination in federally assisted programs). For a general discussion of such "cross-
cuts," see Cappalli, Mandates Attached to Federal Grants: Sweet and Sour Federalism, 13 URB.
LAW. 143 (1981).
45. See, e.g., OMB Circular No. A-102, Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants-
in-Aid to State and Local Governments, 42 Fed. Reg. 45,827 (1977); OMB Circular No. A-I10,
Grants and Agreements With Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals and Other Nonprofit
Organizations: Uniform Administrative Requirements, 41 Fed. Reg. 32,015 (1976).
46. See OMB Circular No. A-95, Evaluation, Review, and Coordination of Federal and Fed-
erally Assisted Programs and Projects, 41 Fed. Reg. 2052 (1976).
47. See OMB Circular No. A-21, Principles for Determining Costs Applicable to Grants,
Contracts, and Other Agreements With Educational Institutions, 44 Fed. Reg. 12,386 (1979);
OMB Circular No. A-87, Cost Principles for State and Local Governments, 46 Fed. Reg. 9548
(1981); OMB Circular No. A-122, Cost Principles for Nonprofit Organizations, 45 Fed. Reg.
46,022 (1980) (as corrected by 46 Fed. Reg. 17,185 (1981)).
48. Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4244 (1976).
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Third, democratic systems of law involve sets of rights and duties
possessed by interacting parties. If all rights are held by one side, we
have monarchy, oligarchy, or other forms of absolutism. This may
have been an accurate description of federal aid in its earlier years,
although practical and political constraints were often asserted as hold-
ing absolute federal power in check.49 Today's federal assistance has
been democratized through the vesting of substantive rights in recipi-
ents of federal aid. The key substantive right is that of receiving funds
upon compliance with all preconditions.5" Such right may be success-
fully asserted in court to release an impoundment,5' collect an alloca-
tion,52 stop a termination,53 or recover monies due.54 The grant-in-aid
has matured into a type of defeasible property. The grantee has a de-
feasible right to collect the proceeds from the United States. The de-
feasance occurs when the grantee commits a violation of the grant
conditions, and it may be partial or full depending upon the nature of
the violation." To the extent that the program vests implementation
discretion in the grantee-permissible ranges of choice on fund uses, on
policies such as civil rights, and on procedures-these may also be seen
as substantive powers of the grantee in that federal efforts to dictate
actions contrary to the grantee's desires can be thwarted by appropriate
judicial action.56
Fourth, a body of law must have a content of sufficient clarity to be
understood and applied consistently and uniformly. Federal assistance
law has lacked precision in expression and definition because its bulk is
of recent creation and the raw material from which statutes and regula-
49. See, e.g., Weidner, Decision Making in a Federal System, reprinted in part in F.
MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, supra note 12, at 1201.
50. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S 127, 136 (1947).
51. See, e.g., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
52. See, eg., City of Los Angeles v. Adams, 556 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
53. See, e.g., Southern Mut. Help Ass'n v. Califano, 574 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
54. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 494 F.2d 1285 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
55. Compare United States v. City of Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (suit which
could have resulted in repayment of $135 million in revenue-sharing funds for violation of civil
rights requirements), modified on other grounds, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977) with In re Southern
Mut. Help Ass'n, Inc., Dec. No. 20 (HHS Grant App. Bd. June 23, 1976) (challenge to audit
disallowance of $1,385 in travel expenses and $7,000 to produce a film).
56. In hundreds of cases, grantees have been given standing to seek declaratory and injunc-
tive relief against allegedly illegal action by federal sponsors. See generally R. CAPPALLI, supra
note 5, at 108-71.
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tions are created comes mostly from the soft sciences.57 Nonetheless,
each day brings new definitions, new court and board interpretations,
and increased custom and usage. These, in combination with the rea-
sonably clear understanding of assistance's purposes and central con-
cepts, result in a legal system with a precision at least equivalent to
areas such as torts.
Fifth, the body of law must be dependable and enforceable. Other-
wise, it is merely a body of morals or ethics upon which parties cannot
confidently plan their actions. Concerning recipient responsibilities,
the federal government has been able to enforce the standards attached
to the aid from an early date."' This coin's flip side, however, has
borne a different stamp. The national government has claimed its an-
cient prerogatives to alter the rules through revised regulations,59 to
issue informal, undependable rules by way of manuals, instructions,
and guidelines,60 and to refuse to be bound by the statements and as-
surances of its officials.6' This too has changed considerably. Increas-
ingly, the agencies are publishing their rules in the Federal Register and
are thereby binding themselves by giving their rules the force of law.62
Finally, sets of procedures are evolving for the application of the law
of federal assistance. Without a forum for dispute resolution, a body of
purposive, defined, mutual, and dependable rules dissolves into pure
power politics. On the other hand, the most solicitous procedural pro-
tections go for naught if the body of substantive rules to be applied
therein is amorphous, shapeless, arbitrary, and uninspired by com-
57. See, e.g., Eglit, The Age Discrimination 4ct of 1975, As Amended" Genesis and Selected
ProblemAreas, 57 CHI. KENT L. REv. 915, 925 (1981).
58. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (collection
of fiscal penalty for Hatch Act violation); In re School Bd., 475 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1973) (voiding
of grant); United States v. Harrison County, 399 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1968) (injunction to enforce
agreed use of aided public beach); Utah State Bd. for Vocational Educ. v. United States, 287 F.2d
713 (10th Cir. 1961) (recovery of federal funds used for unauthorized purpose).
59. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969) (grantee bound to follow agency
directives issued subsequent to grant).
60. See, e.g., Massachusetts Dep't of Correction v. Law Enforcement Assistance Admin., 605
F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1979) (agency need not follow its written, internal grant selection procedures).
61. The "estoppel" argument drifts like smoke through federal assistance disputes. The
courts blow it away with the ancient canard that the government is not bound by unauthorized
acts and statements of its officials. See, e.g., Robinson v. Vollert, 602 F.2d 87, 93-94 (5th Cir.
1979). Perhaps there is enough fire-agencies backing away from assurances upon which grantees
have reled--to justify a revamping of the doctrine.
62. Seegenerally Yamada, RulemakingRequirementsRelatedto FederalFinancialAssistance,
39 FED. BJ. 89 (1980).
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monly accepted purposes and concepts. Within this broader frame-
work of the emergent law of federal assistance, we finally see the full
significance of the main article. The assistance system now provides a
body of legal principles of a content and character suitable for applica-
tion in due process hearings. And without such hearings the advances
in lawfulness made in the past two decades by the assistance system
will be severely blocked, for, as elsewhere, rights without remedies are
meaningless in the assistance field.
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